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Venezuela Business Forecast Report Q1 2010

Published by: Business Monitor International

Published: Oct. 30, 2009 - 56 Pages


Table of Contents


Executive Summary
Few Silver Linings In 2010
Chapter 1: Political Outlook
SWOT Analysis
BMI Political Risk Ratings
Domestic Policy
Political Polarisation To Persist
President Hugo Chávez has continued to consolidate his power, with opposition forces finding it increasingly difficult to
make their voices heard.
Table: VENEZUELA POLITICAL OVERVIEW
Foreign Policy
Chávez’s Policies Hurt Mercosur Bid
President Hugo Chávez’s increasingly authoritarian stance continues to weaken Venezuela’s case for Mercosur entry in
the eyes of Brazilian and Paraguayan lawmakers.
Chapter 2: Economic Outlook
SWOT Analysis
BMI Economic Risk Ratings
Economic Activity
Economy To Remain Highly Choppy In 2010
Real GDP growth came in at -2.4% y-o-y in Q209. While this was the worst figure in 23 quarters, oil-fuelled government
spending prevented a more intense collapse.
table: ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
Fiscal Policy
Fiscal Account Likely To Remain Wobbly
Although Caracas has acknowledged the need for fiscal parsimony, and appears to have based the 2010 budget on
reasonably plausible assumptions, we believe that problems will persist.
Balance Of Payments
External Outlook Brighter, But Imbalances Remain
In view of the rebound in oil prices since Q109 and downward pressure on imports due to official policy and a weak
parallel exchange rate we have revised our 2009 current account forecast from a US$1.4bn deficit to a US$1.6bn surplus.
Monetary Policy
Core Inflation Still Heading Higher
We are revising down our end-year inflation target from 40.0% to 32.0% as the headline inflation rate continues to lag
the core rate due to pervasive price controls.
table: MONETARY POLICY
Banking Sector
Rolling With The Punches
Despite the dire macroeconomic backdrop, Venezuela’s banking sector is in relatively stable shape, owing to its low
loans to deposit and leverage ratios.
Chapter 3: 10-Year Forecast
The Venezuelan Economy To 2019
Beyond Chávez
Although the Venezuelan economy is likely to experience a tough time over the next two years, we believe that there is
significant economic growth potential over the long term.
table: VENEZUELA Lo ng-Term Macro economic Forecasts
Chapter 4: Special Report
The World’s Fiscal Conundrum
Bleeding Red Ink Across The Globe
Table: WORLD GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE INDICATORS
Table: WORLD GOVERNMENT REVENUE INDICATORS
Table: WORLD FISCAL BALANCE INDICATORS
Chapter 5: Business Environment
SWOT Analysis
BMI Business Environment Risk Ratings
Business Environment Outlook
TABLE: BMI BUSINESS & OPERATIONAL RISK RATINGS
Institutions
TABLE: BMI LEGAL FRAMEWORK RATINGS
Infrastructure
table: LATIN AMERICA, ANNUAL FDI INFLOWS
Market Orientation
TABLE: BMI TRADE RATINGS
Operational Risk
Table: top export desti nations
Chapter 6: Key Sectors
Telecoms
Executive Summary
Venezuela’s telecoms market score increased on the back of increasing Average Revenue Per User (ARPU).
Table: Telecoms Sector - Internet - Historic al Data & Forecasts
Retail
Executive Summary
Generally positive trends in underlying economic growth, an expanding population, the rise in disposable income and
easier access to consumer credit are key factors behind the forecast growth in Venezuela’s retail sales.
Table: Key Retail Indicators, 2006-2013
Chapter 7: BMI Global Assumptions
Global Assumptions
TABLE: GLOBAL ASSUMPTIONS
TABLE: GLOBAL & REGIONAL REAL GDP GROWTH
Table: COMMODITY PRICES

Abstract

The Venezuelan economy is likely to continue to take in water as we enter 2010, with the governmentin no position to offset the significant lull in activity. While the authorities may be rescuedtemporarily by elevated oil prices, the underlying health of the economy will remain on a deterioratingtrajectory in our view. Stubborn inflationary pressures are unlikely to vanish as long asmonetary aggregates continue to swell amid sagging private production. The latter phenomenonwill persist unless price distortions and the government’s nationalistion drive are rolled back. Thusfar, President Hugo Chávez has shown few signs of wanting to revise his populist policies, and, ifanything, looks like he is trying to accelerate his ‘Bolivarian revolution’. Although we believe thatVenezuelans are becoming increasingly disillusioned with Chávez, something which will complicatehis palpable desire to get re-elected in 2012, the risk is that his administration could do seriousdamage to the economy in the meantime.

President Chávez has continued to consolidate his power, with opposition forces finding it increasinglydifficult to make their voices heard. Although we do not foresee any major political upheaval,the slowdown in the economy and stubborn inflationary pressures are likely to complicate thegovernment’s social spending programmes, which in turn could create fissures in Chávez’s traditionalsupport base. Simmering societal tensions will keep the risk of political turbulence elevated,as reflected in Venezuela’s low score (37.5 out of 100) in the ‘social stability’ component of ourshort-term political risk ratings. The poor score is attributable to the country’s very high level ofinflation and a serious risk of public unrest.

Although the rebound in oil prices brought some relief for Chávez’s administration toward the end of2009, prompting us to revise our growth forecast mildly to -3.0% year-on-year (y-o-y) from -5.6%, weexpect the going to remain very tough in 2010. To be sure, the policy-induced structural imbalancesin the economy will not go away any time soon and the government’s decidedly market-unfriendlytone will continue to choke off private sector activity and stifle productivity. One key manifestationof these asymmetries is the wide differential between the official and parallel exchange rates, withthe latter having reached as low as VEF*6.8000/US$ in late April 2009. Although the governmenthas managed to partially narrow the gap, via dollar bond offerings which locals have been able topurchase with bolivars, these measures will unlikely obviate an eventual downward adjustment ofthe highly overvalued VEF2.1500/US$ official rate.

Chávez’s continued seizing of private sector assets throughout 2009 confirmed fears that largesectors of the economy are being subsumed into the state apparatus. The erstwhile focus on theoil, telecommunications, electricity, metal and land sectors has been expanded to include otherareas such as tourism, with another Hilton hotel expropriated in mid-October 2009. Nonetheless,the government remains heavily dependent on foreign expertise if it is to exploit its hydrocarbonriches and will in all probability have to win the commitment of International Oil Companies. Aswe go to print there are reports that the authorities are contemplating improving the terms of theCarabobo oil field auction, scheduled for January 2009, with a lower royalty, but we suspect thatit will have to offer more sweeteners to secure sufficient interest.

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