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Syria Defence and Security Report Q1 2008Published by: Business Monitor International Published: Feb. 4, 2008 - 40 Pages Table of Contents
AbstractThe beginnings of a potential turn in Syria’s diplomatic and defence positioning in the Middle East beganto be seen in Q407. At the end of the preceding quarter an Israeli air strike on unidentified Syrian facilities - rumoured to be part of some kind of North Korean-supported nuclear programme - appeared to point to more of the same old strategic isolation for the country, as part of an ‘axis of evil’ (in Bushspeak) or, alternatively as an uncompromising anti-Zionist pole (Ahmadinejad-speak). Yet to the contrary, no sooner had the dust settled on the military action than a process of rapprochement began. A key milestone was Washington’s decision to invite Syria to participate in the opening of the Middle East peace conference held in Annapolis on November 27 and 28. The US government changed the agenda, to formally include the Israeli-Syria Golan Heights dispute, so as to secure Syrian participation. In a separate but also significant initiative, Russia said it was planning a separate mediating role in early 2008 to promote Israel-Syria negotiations over the Heights. A series of other developments contributed to the diplomatic opening. US military leaders in Iraq acknowledged in Q407 that the flow of jihadists from across the Syrian border - volunteer fighters who join the anti-US insurgency - had begun to dwindle. While Syria’s interventionist stance in Lebanese politics had not fundamentally changed, a number of Western governments hailed what they saw as a new willingness to act as a moderating influence and broker a deal on the Lebanese presidency. The Wall Street Journal quoted a ‘senior Israeli official’ in November saying that ‘this is one of those moments in history where the Syrians have been given an opportunity to jump. If they do jump, they will be embraced’. One motive behind these moves was said to be Washington’s desire to drive a wedge between Syria and Iran, as part of its ongoing strategy of isolating the Tehran government. Damascus in the meantime seemed to be welcoming the new diplomatic opening without giving up any of its key foreign policy positions, including its alliance with Tehran and its support for Hizbullah in Lebanon. The Syrian armed forces have declined in terms of both capabilities and equipment of late, as US sanctions and subsequent cash shortfalls have forced the government to reduce its military spending. Military expenditure in Syria is low, having not increased in recent years. Syria lacks an established indigenous defence industry of significance, and its armed forces are almost entirely dependent upon procurement from overseas. This reliance has led to the Syrian armed forces being left under-equipped and reliant on obsolete, ageing equipment, with the government unable to procure modern hardware due to economic restrictions and internationally imposed arms trade sanctions. This scenario is unlikely to change in the near future given Syria’s weak economy and current poor relations with the majority of the international community. However, a recently signed strategic accord with Iran could see financial and technological investment in the Syrian defence industry. Syrian arms imports generally originate from anti-US states such as North Korea and Iran, while other suppliers are very limited given the extensive embargoes placed upon states exporting arms to Syria. The re-emergence of Russia as a potential supplier of arms to Syria may prove to stimulate its arms import trade and address the issue of Syria’s depleted armed forces through the supply and upgrade of its hardware. However, the process will be both slow and limited, as Moscow will be well aware of probable international condemnations of such liaisons. Syria itself does not have the surplus equipment or the production facilities to be able to export arms overseas. Get Full Details About This Report >> |
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