In the Beginning. The first use of remotely operated vehicles (RPVs) by a military occurred more than 1,500 years ago. These RPVs were kites that dropped bombs, checked weather and wind changes, and signaled to other elements indications of a widely dispersed army.
The first unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) in the modern sense appeared during the First World War. In 1914, a British engineer tried to build a radio-controlled airplane, designed to reduce casualties over France. This project met with little success.
Near the end of the war, the Kettering Bug debuted. This was a flying bomb made from a reconfigured biplane. The bug was very rudimentary. The U.S. built about 50 of these systems, but the war ended before they could enter combat.
During World War II, each side experimented with unmanned air vehicles. Germany developed attack drones launched from aircraft and flown to the target via remote control.
The allies experimented with remotely controlled B-17 bombers under the Aphrodite Project. These aircraft, no longer suitable for combat missions, were packed with high explosives, flown to a designated position over Europe, and then crashed into a target by an accompanying control aircraft. The allies launched 11 of these remotely controlled bombers during the war. None were very successful and they proved easy to shoot down.
Some B-17s were converted to DB-17Ps and served with the 3215th Drone Squadron at Patrick Air Force Base in Florida. During "Operation Greenhouse," a series of atmospheric nuclear weapon tests conducted by the U.S. in the spring of 1951 with radio-controlled B-17 aircraft measured blast and thermal effects and collected radioactive cloud samples.
Not for another two decades and another war would unmanned air vehicles once more be called into combat service.
The U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War provided the impetus for the large-scale deployment of UAVs. To reduce the risk to aircrews, the U.S. began to employ UAVs to reconnoiter potential targets proximate to heavy air defense sites. During the U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, the Teledyne Ryan Model 147 performed a total of 3,435 operational sorties over North Vietnam, with an 84-percent survival rate.
Despite the undisputed success of the UAV over North Vietnam, at the end of the war, the U.S. concluded such operations and relegated these systems to (then) more traditional roles as airborne targets and simulators.
Once combat operations ended, the pressure on the U.S. military to reduce casualties disappeared and so did the desire for UAVs. Unmanned air vehicles suffered from low reliability and a lack of visibility among important leaders within the government and military. Furthermore, many aviators within the U.S. military saw UAVs as a threat to their existence, fearing that machines would replace them in the cockpit. In 1981, a U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report noted, "Remotely piloted vehicles seem to suffer from the attitude of users and not from technological drawbacks or unfeasible systems."
Furthermore, some in the services saw unmanned air vehicles competing with aircraft for funding.
Although these are examples from U.S. experience, similar reactions have occurred from services in Europe and elsewhere. This view has turned up repeatedly, but its prevalence is slowly diminishing.
Not Your Daddy's UAV
The unmanned air vehicle is not a replacement for manned aircraft, but rather a supplement to these formations. The proper use of UAVs is to take the human element one step further back from actual combat. The UAV adds one more layer of weaponry between human soldiers and their opponents. Unmanned air vehicles would accompany human-piloted flights to deal with targets of opportunity or to lead an attack in order to absorb some of that which is thrown up by the air defense systems in the area. They would be used to take out air defense radars (both fixed and mobile) and to attack armored columns, marshaling yards, railroad stations, and bridges. Where possible, these systems are to perform missions too dangerous for manned platforms or, more accurately, that are a waste of valuable human resources. Furthermore, companies design and market these systems as capable of operation by individuals with little or no aviation experience, and therefore, they are no longer a threat to pilots.
Combat Experiences. Unmanned air vehicles played a significant role in Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon (Operation Peace for Galilee). Syria's SAM batteries in the Bekaa Valley caused considerable problems for Israeli aircraft.
To counter this threat, the Israelis used unmanned air vehicles as decoys. The UAVs were sent in ahead of a flight of Wild Weasel-type aircraft to trick the Syrians into switching on their fire control radars and possibly launching most of their ready-to-fire missiles. Once the sites were located, the Wild Weasels would use anti-radiation missiles and general-purpose bombs to engage the batteries and inflict serious enough damage to shut them down. Using this tactic, the Israelis were able to sweep the Bekaa Valley almost completely clear (at least 80 percent on the first day) of the surface-to-air missile threat.
This successful operation helped rejuvenate interest in UAV systems. Still, problems with UAVs persisted. The U.S. Army's Aquila program ended without the system entering production.
The U.S. Navy's Pioneer UAV program was more successful. Apparently, the problems encountered with early operations of the Pioneer were due more to operator inexperience than to system failures.
The first invasion of Iraq (Operation Desert Storm) saw the deployment of a large number of UAVs by all three of the U.S. military services, including the U.S. Marine Corps and various allies. The Pioneer was termed "perhaps the most innovative new item" on the battlefield.
Flying One Million Hours and Never Leaving Home
The man-portable Pointer UAV was also involved in this operation. Although the Pointer was used on the front line, the system suffered from its fragility, short range, and inability to operate effectively in the harsh desert environment.France operated the MART battery. At that time, the MART system was undergoing operational acceptance tests.
Despite high attrition among the UAVs deployed, they performed missions that otherwise would have gone undone or could have resulted in additional allied casualties.
Operation Allied Force, the NATO mission in Kosovo, saw an even larger deployment of UAVs. The United States, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom all deployed unmanned air vehicles to the Balkans. Germany was the first to begin UAV operations over Kosovo, deploying its CL-289 system from a base in Macedonia. The U.S.-operated Predator UAV made its debut over Kosovo. Although NATO lost nearly two dozen UAVs, the systems provided the Alliance with crucial information on the Yugoslav military's activities in Kosovo and in Serbia proper. The UAV deployment to the Balkans may have stimulated interest in these systems, but it caused no significant increases in development or acquisition funding.
The Kosovo mission did highlight the Pentagon's shortage of airborne surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft. In addition, European nations realized their systems lacked the necessary range and endurance to meet mission needs.
The big change for UAVs came after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. The subsequent U.S. invasions of Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom) and Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom) would see the largest deployment yet of UAVs by the United States or any other country. Still, the phenomenal growth in this force lay ahead.
The U.S. and its allies quickly defeated the conventional forces of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, but were soon facing insurgencies in both nations.
In Iraq, Kurds, Sunnis, Shiites, Arabs, Baathists, and an array of others began fighting for a piece of Saddam's former empire, with U.S. troops often caught in the middle.
U.S. UAS Flight Hours
Year
Hours
1987
1,000
1988
1,200
1989
2,500
1990
5,000
1991
6,000
1992
8,000
1993
10,000
1994
12,000
1995
15,000
1996
20,000
1997
30,000
1998
40,000
1999
60,000
2000
70,000
2001
90,000
2002
100,000
2003
140,000
2004
197,000
2005
235,000
2006
315,000
2007
558,000
2008
623,775
2009
639,819
2010
811,308
2011
857,527
2012
870,000
The U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq faced the classic problem - not enough warm bodies to garrison the entire country. In addition, a successful counterinsurgency campaign needs a security force with eyes everywhere. Unmanned air vehicles provided such a capability without a significant strain on the available manpower.
Since 2001, U.S. inventory has grown from 167 to more than 7,000 unmanned aircraft. These UAVs accumulate hundreds of thousands of flight hours each year. Pentagon funding for unmanned aircraft is now in the billions of dollars, a massive increase over pre-9/11 levels. Despite the billions spent on procurement, however, the United States still does not have sufficient numbers of unmanned aircraft to meet the demand.
Besides reconnaissance duties, these unmanned aircraft systems have taken on a greater role in performing strike missions, especially along the Afghan-Pakistani border. The Pentagon calls unmanned aircraft its most effective weapon in the fight against al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups.
By November 2011, unmanned aircraft operated by the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force had logged around 2.7-million flight hours (roughly 1.2 million belong to the Army). More than 87 percent of the time, these air vehicles have been involved in combat.
Video Game Wars
The MQ-1 Predator UAVs have logged one million hours in the air (920,000 in combat) through the beginning of August 2011. The RQ-4 Global Hawk flew 54,000 hours (most during combat missions).
The U.S. Navy's unmanned aerial vehicles flew more than 21,800 hours in 2011 (some 21,356 in combat). The ScanEagle accounts for more than 10,000 of those hours. Overall, flight hours by U.S. Navy UAVs through 2011 are as follows: Shadow - 27,251; ScanEagle - 18,163; Global Hawk (BAMS-D) - 6,567; and Fire Scout - 3,600.
For the U.S. Army, total flight hours in 2010 amounts to 204,289, with 101,574 flown by July 2011.
Israeli-built Hermes 450 UAVs are supporting British troops operating in Afghanistan. These UAVs are part of 22 Battery, 32 Regiment Royal Artillery and operate over Helmand from Camp Bastion. These UAVs have flown more than 5,300 times in theater since 2007.
The U.K. Royal Air Force operates at least 10 MQ-9 Reaper UAVs.
Israel also makes extensive use of UAVs. In the summer of 2006, Israeli troops entered southern Lebanon (Operation Change of Direction) with UAVs providing intelligence on Hezbollah movements, resupply routes, and missile/rocket launching sites.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) gave high praise to the performance of its UAVs during the fighting in southern Lebanon. The IAI Heron 1 performed "beyond expectation" during the war, according to the IDF. The IAI Searcher 2s flew thousands of mission hours with excellent reliability, according to IAI. The Elbit Systems Hermes 450 accumulated 15,000 flight hours, flying round-the-clock missions.
Still, the fighting has shown that Israel's UAVs do need improved payloads.
When Israel launched Operation Cast Lead against Hamas, the Palestinian terrorist group that controls the Gaza Strip, in 2007, it deployed a massive UAV force. Perhaps 1,000 unmanned aircraft or more participated in Operation Cast Lead. This force included a large number of man-portable systems, as well as armed UAVs.
Unmanned aircraft played a part in Operation Unified Protector, the NATO-led effort to support rebels fighting to overthrow the Qadhafi regime in Libya. The U.S. deployed the Fire Scout, Global Hawk, Predator, ScanEagle, and Reaper UAVs during this operation. British pilots controlled armed UAVs during the fighting in Libya, and a U.S.-operated Predator took part in the action that ended with Qadhafi's capture on October 20, 2011.
Since the end of Operation Cast Lead, Israel has continued to make great use of its fleet of unmanned aircraft. The Israeli Air Force's UAV fleet has become its busiest operational tool, handling about a third of all IAF missions. Several UAVs are roaming the skies at any given time. A command center at the Palmachim base in central Israel controls the IDF's unmanned aircraft.
In the future, Israel's UAV fleet will be even busier and probably larger. The IAF plans to give its UAVs a bigger piece of the operational pie. Israeli officials estimate that 50 percent of all aircraft in use with the Israel Defense Forces will be unmanned systems by 2030. The IAF says that quite a few missions have already gone from manned to unmanned operations.
In 2012, a number of UAVs began operating over Syria.
Unmanned air vehicles from Israel and the United States are reportedly monitoring the deteriorating situation in Syria. In addition, the Syrian government is using Iranian-built UAVs to support its crackdown on opposition protestors and armed rebels. These UAVs have been in use since at least February. The UAVs are reportedly operating over Kafr Batna, Homs, Hamah, and Aleppo.
